

Fireblocks Upgradeable Tokens Audit ERC1155F



Table of Contents

Table of Contents	2
Summary	3
Scope	4
System Overview	5
Privileged Roles	5
Trust Assumptions	6
Low Severity	8
L-01 Retrieving the Whole Access List Might Revert	8
Notes & Additional Information	8
N-01 Lack of Security Contact	8
N-02 Missing Named Parameters in Mapping	9
N-03 Unnecessary Variable Cast	9
N-04 Unused Imports	10
N-05 Lack ofgap Variables	10
N-06 Incorrect Storage Gap Size in AccessListUpgradeable	11
N-07 Confusing Error Used	11
N-08 Missing Input Validation	11
N-09 Typographical Errors and Incorrect Comments	12
N-10 Gas Optimization	12
N-11 Missing Functionality For Rescuing ERC-721 and ERC-1155 Tokens	12
Conclusion	15

Summary

Type DeFi Total Issues 12 (8 resolved, 1 partially)

Timeline From 2023-11-13 Critical Severity 0 (0 resolved)
To 2023-11-17 Issues

Languages Solidity High Severity 0 (0 resolved) Issues

Medium Severity 0 (0 resolved)
Issues

Low Severity Issues 1 (1 partially)

Notes & Additional 11 (8 resolved)
Information

Scope

We audited the **Blockfold** repository at commit e7003dfb.

Following the conclusion of the audit, Fireblocks has updated the license to AGPL-3.0-or-later in <u>pull request #1</u> at commit <u>6d8327b</u>. This update has had no impact on the security of the source code logic.

In scope were the following contracts:

```
contracts
├── ERC1155F.sol
  - library
    — AccessRegistry
        AccessListUpgradeable.sol

    AccessRegistrySubscriptionUpgradeable.sol

         — AllowList.sol
          DenyList.sol
        └─ interface
          └─ IAccessRegistry.sol
      - Errors
        ├─ LibErrors.sol
          - interface
           ☐ IERC1155Errors.sol
      - Utils
        ContractUriUpgradeable.sol
         MarketplaceOperatorUpgradeable.sol
         PauseUpgradeable.sol
         — RoleAccessUpgradeable.sol
          SalvageUpgradeable.sol

    TokenUriUpgradeable.sol
```

System Overview

The Fireblocks Upgradeable Tokens project implements three upgradeable token contracts, namely, <code>ERC1155F</code>. This is compliant with the ERC-1155 token standard and additional functionality has been integrated for managing access control. The token facilitate the configuration of an access list for token transfers, providing the flexibility of implementing either an allowlist, where only addresses on the list can utilize the tokens, or a denylist, which restricts addresses on the list from interacting with the contract.

Privileged Roles

The protocol implements multiple privileged roles that are tied to the ERC1155F contract.

The holder of DEFAULT ADMIN ROLE can:

· Grant roles to other addresses.

The holder of **UPGRADER ROLE** can:

• Upgrade the implementation contracts to a new version.

The holder of PAUSER ROLE can:

Pause and unpause a contract.

The holder of **CONTRACT ADMIN ROLE** can:

- Change the used access list address.
- Update the contract URI.
- · Update the token URI address.
- Update the marketplace operator address.

The holder of MINTER ROLE can:

· Mint tokens.

The holder of **BURNER ROLE** can:

Burn tokens.

The holder of RECOVERY ROLE can:

• Recover tokens from an account that is missing access.

The holder of SALVAGE ROLE can:

• Recover ETH and ERC-20 tokens that were sent to a token contract itself.

Trust Assumptions

• The holders of the DEFAULT_ROLE_ADMIN role are expected to be non-malicious and to act in the project's best interest.

Low Severity

L-01 Retrieving the Whole Access List Might Revert

The AccessListUpgradeable contract includes a getAccessList function which retrieves all values from the access list. This function utilizes the values function of EnumerableSetUpgradeable. AddressSet, copying the entire storage into memory. This might lead to problems when the access list is excessively large as the function execution remains susceptible to the block gas limit, resulting in the call getting reverted.

Consider implementing an additional function that can be used when the value set gets too large. This function should return only a subset or slice of the values from the entire set.

Update: Acknowledged, partially resolved in <u>merge request #15</u> at commit <u>130dbb5</u>. The Fireblocks team stated:

To address this issue, we've tackled it by incorporating additional documentation into the function. This decision was prompted by the fact that the purpose of getAccessList() is to serve as a support function tailored for fetching compact access lists in smaller projects. In the case of larger projects equipped with more extensive access lists, it is advisable to devise custom indexing logic to efficiently retrieve all addresses from the access list.

Notes & Additional Information

N-01 Lack of Security Contact

Providing a specific security contact (e.g., an email address or ENS name) within a smart contract greatly simplifies the process for individuals to communicate if they identify a vulnerability in the code. This practice is beneficial as it permits the code owners to dictate the communication channel for vulnerability disclosure, eliminating the risk of miscommunication

or failure to report due to a lack of knowledge on how to do so. Additionally, if the contract incorporates third-party libraries and a bug surfaces in them, it becomes easier for the maintainers of those libraries to contact the appropriate person about the problem and provide mitigation instructions.

Consider adding a NatSpec comment containing a security contact on top of the contract definitions. Using the <code>@custom:security-contact</code> convention is recommended as it has been adopted by the <code>OpenZeppelin Wizard</code> and the <code>ethereum-lists</code>.

Update: Acknowledged, not resolved. The Fireblocks team stated:

Because these contracts are crafted as templates for other companies and entities to deploy on a larger scale. There cannot be a single security contact. Therefore, when a company deploys one of these contracts, they are are welcome to provide their own security contact independently through the contract URI.

N-02 Missing Named Parameters in Mapping

Since <u>Solidity 0.8.18</u>, developers can utilize named parameters in mappings. This means mappings can take the form of <u>mapping(KeyType KeyName? => ValueType ValueName?)</u>. This updated syntax provides a more transparent representation of a mapping's purpose.

For instance, the <u>tokenUri</u> mapping in the <u>TokenUriUpgradeable</u> <u>contract</u> does not utilize named parameters.

Consider adding named parameters to the mappings in order to improve readability and maintainability of the codebase.

Update: Acknowledged, resolved in <u>merge request #12</u> at commit <u>967c097</u>.

N-03 Unnecessary Variable Cast

In the <u>AccessRegistrySubscriptionUpgradeable</u> <u>contract</u>, the <u>accessRegistryUpdate</u> <u>function</u> is unnecessarily casted.

To improve the overall clarity, intent, and readability of the codebase, consider removing any unnecessary casts.

Update: Acknowledged, resolved in merge request #9 at commit 69c5add.

N-04 Unused Imports

Throughout the codebase, there are multiple imports that are unused and could be removed:

- <u>import {LibErrors} from "../Errors/LibErrors.sol";</u> imports unused alias LibErrors in <u>ContractUriUpgradeable.sol</u>
- <u>import {LibErrors} from "../Errors/LibErrors.sol";</u> imports unused alias LibErrors in <u>MarketplaceOperatorUpgradeable.sol</u>
- <u>import {LibErrors} from "../Errors/LibErrors.sol";</u> imports unused alias LibErrors in <u>PauseUpgradeable.sol</u>
- <u>import {LibErrors} from "../Errors/LibErrors.sol";</u> imports unused alias LibErrors in <u>TokenUriUpgradeable.sol</u>

Consider removing unused imports to improve the overall clarity and readability of the codebase.

Update: Acknowledged, resolved in merge request #6 at commit 4243399.

N-05 Lack of **gap** Variables

Throughout the <u>codebase</u>, there are multiple upgradeable contracts that do not have a <u>gap</u> variable. For instance:

- The AllowList contract
- The <u>DenyList</u> contract
- The **ERC1155F** contract

Note that the current implementation does not require the implementation of the __gap storage variable, as the listed contracts are not being inherited. However, it is still recommended to include it as it implies that the contract implementations might be upgraded and additional storage variables might be introduced in the future.

Consider adding a __gap storage variable to avoid future storage clashes in upgradeable contracts.

Update: Acknowledged, not resolved. The Fireblocks team stated:

Contracts lacking __gap variables are not needed for our use case since upgrades are intended to occur through contract inheritance. In this process, the initial implementation, V1, is inherited by V2, where the new logic resides. This enables the addition of storage slots without any conflict with existing slots.

N-06 Incorrect Storage Gap Size in AccessListUpgradeable

The AccessListUpgradeable contract uses a __gap storage variable of size 49. It assumes that the _accessList storage variable occupies one storage slot, whereas in reality, it takes two storage slots. The _accessList is of type EnumerableSetUpgradeable.AddressSet which is a struct that uses 2 storage slots.

Consider changing the size of the __gap storage variable in the AccessListUpgradeable contract from 49 to 48.

Update: Acknowledged, resolved in merge request #5 at commit 519e415.

N-07 Confusing Error Used

The <code>ERC1155F</code> contracts feature a <code>recoverTokens</code> function designed to recover tokens from accounts lacking access. The problem arises when the account already has access to the tokens, resulting in transactions reverting with a potentially confusing error such as <code>ERC155InvalidReceiver</code>. In this context, since the account is not the receiver, the error should not imply receiver-related issues.

Consider adding a new error which indicates that the account has access to the tokens.

Update: Acknowledged, resolved in merge request #10 at commit 6b3f311.

N-08 Missing Input Validation

The <u>mintBatch</u> function of the <u>ERC1155F</u> contract is missing array size validation. Consider validating that id, amount and URI arrays are of the same size.

Consider implementing the suggested validations in order to prevent unexpected behavior that may lead to potential attacks on the protocol.

Update: Acknowledged, resolved in merge request #11 at commit 6953e70.

N-09 Typographical Errors and Incorrect Comments

Consider addressing the following typographical errors and incorrect comments:

- The <u>AccessRegistrySubscriptionUpgradeable</u> contract implements the <u>AccessRegsitrySubscription_init</u> function that has a typo in its name. It should be <u>AccessRegistrySubscription_init</u>.
- The NatSpec comments that describe the hasAccess functions implemented in the AccessListUpgradeable, AllowList, and DenyList contracts are using the name of the parameter claim instead of data.

Update: Acknowledged, resolved in merge request #4 at commit 7a5e68e.

N-10 Gas Optimization

In the codebase, there are several instances of potential gas optimizations:

- The _requireHasAccess function, present in the _ERC1155F contracts, redundantly checks the _isSender value twice. It would be more efficient to initially verify if the account has access through the _accessRegistry contract. If it does not have access, then based on the _isSender value, either revert with an invalid sender or invalid receiver error.
- The codebase follows a common pattern of checking access after updating state variables. For instance, in the RoleAccessUpgradeable contract, the revokeRole function calls the authorizeRoleAccess function after updating the role. To prioritize failing early and conserving gas, consider performing the access check before updating the state variables.

To improve gas consumption, readability and code quality, consider refactoring wherever possible.

Update: Acknowledged, resolved in merge request #13 at commit f84408b.

N-11 Missing Functionality For Rescuing ERC-721 and ERC-1155 Tokens

The <u>SalvageUpgradeable</u> abstract contract, inherited by the <u>ERC1155F</u> contract, implements the logic for <u>rescuing ETH</u> and <u>ERC-20 tokens</u>. This is useful for when tokens are

accidentally sent to the token contract itself instead of a valid recipient. However, the rescue logic only works for rescuing ETH and ERC-20 tokens, not ERC-721 or ERC-1155 tokens. As such, while the ERC-20 tokens accidentally sent to any of the three token contracts can be rescued, ERC-721 or ERC-1155 tokens cannot be.

Consider adding the functionality for rescuing ERC-721 and ERC-1155 tokens accidentally sent to the ERC1155F contracts.

Update: Acknowledged, not resolved. The Fireblocks team stated:

Currently, there is no observed customer demand for salvaging an ERC-721 or ERC-1155 token. While this functionality could potentially be incorporated later through an upgrade, we are cautious about subjecting users to additional bytecode and gas fees for a feature that may not be utilized at the present moment.

Conclusion

The Fireblocks Upgradeable Tokens project introduces upgradeable token contract adhering to ERC-1155 standard, with added features for access control. These tokens allow the creation of an access list for transfers, enabling the implementation of either an allow list, restricting usage to specified addresses, or a deny list, preventing interactions with addresses on the list.

One low severity was issue was identified. In addition, various recommendations have been made to enhance the quality and documentation of the codebase. The Blockfold team was responsive and timely answered any questions we had about the codebase.